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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the association between executive compensation and performance. It uniquely 
utilises a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms within a three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) simultaneous equation framework. Results based on estimating a conventional single equation 
model indicate that the executive pay and performance sensitivity is relatively weak, whereas those 
based on estimating a 3SLS model generally suggest improved executive pay and performance 
sensitivity. Our findings highlight the need for future research to control for possible simultaneous 
interdependencies when estimating the executive pay and performance link. The findings are generally 
robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, executive 
pay and performance proxies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that through optimal contracting, executive pay, especially that 
involving equity/performance-linked compensation, can limit agency problems by aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders. However, the recent global financial crisis precipitated by increased risk-taking 
and pay motives of top executives of major banks (Tung, 2010; Aebi et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012; 
Paligorova, 2011; Tang, 2012; Polat and Nisar, 2013; Wesep and Wang, 2013) has reignited the debate 
regarding the effectiveness of executive compensation packages in mitigating agency conflicts in modern 
corporations (Goering, 1996; Murphy, 1997; Grundy and Li, 2010; Van Essen et al., 2012; Berger et al., 
2013; Cook and Burress, 2013). Whilst a number of papers have examined the link between executive pay 
and corporate performance, the general conclusion is that the link is weak (Murphy, 1999; Canarella and 
Nourayi, 2008; Dong et al., 2010; Elsila et al., 2013; Kabir et al., 2013; Tiani, 2013).  
A number of reasons may explain the weak findings of past studies. First, since executive pay is just 
one of the possible corporate governance (CG) mechanisms that companies can employ to minimise agency 
conflicts (Mehran, 1995; Borisova et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2012), its effectiveness may depend on the 
simultaneous use of other CG mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Beiner et 
al., 2004, 2006; Livne et al., 2013; O‟Connor et al., 2013). A major implication of this is that estimating the 
executive pay and corporate performance sensitivity through the use of single equation modelling 
techniques can result in endogenous associations (Core et al., 1999; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Connelly 
et al., 2012; Gil-Alana et al., 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). Existing studies, however, have mainly used 
single equation modelling, and thereby crucially ignored endogeneity problems that may be posed by the 
possible simultaneous use of alternative CG mechanisms in estimating the executive pay and corporate 
performance sensitivity (Guest, 2009; Wintoki et al., 2012; Zhao, 2013).  
Second, the extant literature has focused mostly on cash-based rather than equity-based executive 
compensation (Conyon, 1997; Benito and Conyon, 1999; Kato and Long, 2006; Buck et al., 2008; Shen and 
Zhang, 2013). In contrast, corporate performance is more sensitive to equity-based than cash-based 
executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Ozkan, 
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2011), and this may also explain the weak findings of past studies. Third, Main (1991), Lewellen et al. 
(1992), Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Firth et al. (2006, 2007) show that executive pay differs 
substantially across countries due to variations in legal, institutional, cultural and CG practices.  
However, past studies are concentrated in the UK and US, presenting comparatively similar 
institutional contexts (Ang et al., 2002; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Cunat and 
Guadalupe, 2009; Sun et al., 2009). In developing countries with different institutional settings, with 
particular regard to CG reforms, ownership structures and executive director compensation incentives, the 
link between executive pay and corporate performance can be expected to differ from what has been found 
in industrialised countries. As such, studying the association between executive pay and corporate 
performance in developing countries, where empirical evidence has been limited, contributes to a more 
complete understanding of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. A 
major reason for the paucity of empirical evidence in developing countries, especially African countries, is 
the difficulty in obtaining data of sufficient frequency and duration for analysis (Okeahalam, 2004; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Mangena et al.,2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Fosu, 2013).  
Recent CG reforms in South Africa (SA), however, provide a unique and potentially rewarding context 
for such a contribution. The recent South African CG reforms incorporate the expectation that executive 
pay will be strongly linked to corporate performance, and also require listed firms to fully disclose 
executive compensation details in their annual reports, making available information that hitherto has been 
publicly inaccessible. This development provides the opportunity to collect data on total pay of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), as well as on the total pay of all executives and on CG in order to investigate the 
association between executive compensation and performance for a sample of SA listed companies, 
enabling us to make a number of contributions to the extant literature.  
The paper documents for the first time evidence on the levels of executive pay, as well as the 
association between executive compensation and corporate performance in SA. Distinct from most past 
studies, we provide evidence on how corporate performance is associated with both the total pay of the 
CEO and that of all other executives, as well as on the link between cash (i.e., salary, performance bonus, 
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pension contribution and others) and non-cash or equity-based (i.e., granted shares, vested/exercised 
options and any other longer-term incentive plans) compensation and corporate performance.  
In addition, we make a methodological contribution by explicitly addressing the potential endogeneity 
problems that may arise from the possible simultaneous use of director pay and other CG mechanisms. 
Specifically, we employ data available on five CG mechanisms, including board size, percentage of non-
executive directors (NEDs), leverage, block ownership, and institutional ownership, in addition to financial 
performance and total executive pay, in order to develop a system of seven simultaneous equations, which 
are estimated by using three-stage least squares (3SLS). Unlike conventional single equation modelling, our 
design has the advantage of allowing simultaneous interdependencies to exist among executive pay, 
performance and the CG mechanisms, by permitting each mechanism to simultaneously affect executive 
pay, but also allowing executive pay to affect the choice of each mechanism.  
Our results are threefold. First, using a sample of SA listed firms, our results based on estimating a 
conventional single equation model suggest that the executive pay and corporate performance sensitivity is 
relatively weak, ranging from 0.025 for the total cash compensation of all executives to 0.098 for total CEO 
pay. Second, the results indicate that the executive pay and corporate performance sensitivity is stronger for 
non-cash based pay than cash-based compensation, as well as CEO pay being more sensitive to 
performance than those of lower placed executives.  
Third, and distinct from existing studies, results based on estimating a 3SLS within a simultaneous 
equation model that dynamically allows for simultaneous interdependencies among executive pay, 
corporate performance and the CG mechanisms generally suggest an improvement in the executive pay and 
corporate performance sensitivity, ranging between 0.163 for total pay of all executives and 0.197 for total 
CEO compensation. Our results highlight the need for future research to take into account a set of CG 
mechanisms in addition to executive pay and performance within a simultaneous equation framework in 
estimating the executive pay and corporate performance link. The findings are generally robust across a raft 
of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities and firm-level fixed-effects, as well 
as different types of executive pay, CG and corporate performance proxies. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses CG and executive pay 
practices within the SA institutional framework. The following sections review the prior literature on 
executive compensation and corporate performance, discuss the research design, report empirical results 
and additional analyses, with the conclusion containing a summary and conclusion.  
 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE PAY AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Attempts at improving CG practices in SA companies began with the publication of the first King 
Report in 1994 (King I) (Armstrong et al., 2006). In particular, King I emphasised the importance of 
properly functioning corporate boards of directors, as well as adopting many of the standards and principles 
that were contained in a plethora of national and international CG codes, especially those of the UK‟s 1992 
Cadbury Report (Rossouw et al., 2002). However, while King I suggested that executives‟ remuneration 
should be recommended by a Remuneration Committee (RCOM), it failed to address the composition and 
independence of the committee, as well as the structure and possible involvement of shareholders in the 
determination of executive pay (Rossouw et al., 2002; Ntim et al., 2012a, b).  
During the late 1990s, the country experienced a number of high profile corporate failures, such as 
the collapse of the Macmed, Leisurenet and Nedbank companies, which were attributed mainly to poor CG 
practices, including increased executive compensation (Okeahalam, 2004; Sarra, 2004). These domestic 
problems in combination with increased international attention on CG (Rossouw et al., 2002; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008), resulted in a review of King I and the subsequent publication of a second King Report 
(King II) in 2002. Generally, King II builds on and expands many of the best CG practices of King I, 
including a detailed section (see subsection 2.5 of King II) that deals with executive remuneration issues. 
Most noticeably, it recommends that all the members of the RCOM, including the chairperson, should be 
independent NEDs, but the views of executives, especially those of the CEO, may be taken into account by 
the committee in determining executive remuneration.  
An important aspect of King II is that it expects shareholders, especially institutional ones, to play 
an active part in setting executive pay, including the requirement that executive remuneration be approved 
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by shareholders at an annual general meeting, in which the chairperson of the RCOM should be available to 
answer questions. Crucially, it suggests that companies should engage in full disclosure of executive 
remuneration, giving details of fees, salaries, bonuses, pension contributions, share options and any other 
long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) in the annual report. Of greater significance, King II recommends that a 
larger part of the total remuneration package of executives should be linked to executive performance in the 
form of equity in order to align executive interests with those of shareholders. Overall, it requires 
companies to develop a formal and transparent executive pay policy backed by a clear statement of the 
philosophy and basis for executive compensation in the annual report.   
Additional to the pursuance of recent CG reforms is the feature that, unlike the UK and US but 
similar to most Asian and some European countries, ownership of firms is highly concentrated (Firth et al., 
2006, 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a, b). Distinct from most Asian and European countries, however, the 
concentration1 has mainly emerged through the creation of tall corporate pyramids and complicated cross 
shareholdings rather than via individual block ownerships (Barr et al., 1995; Connelly et al., 2012). The 
feature of ownership concentration together with the historically poor record of implementing and 
enforcing corporate regulations (Ntim et al., 2012a, b), have greatly weakened the market for corporate and 
managerial control in SA; giving rise to a number of agency problems, including high executive pay, often 
to the detriment of employees and minority shareholders (Sarra, 2004; Armstrong et al., 2006). 
Given this background to the recent CG reforms, as well as SA‟s unique corporate context, the link 
between executive pay and performance can arguably be expected to be different from those that have been 
reported for developed, as well as other developing countries. The main objective of this paper, therefore, is 
to investigate the link between executive pay and performance following the introduction of King II. 
 
3. PRIOR LITERATURE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE 
 
The executive compensation and performance literature has in the main developed from two major 
contrasting theoretical views2: optimal contracting and managerial power (Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003, 2004; Cheng and Firth, 2006; Van Essen et al., 2012). The optimal contracting view considers 
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executive compensation packages as a result of arm‟s length dealing between independent corporate boards 
and executives that leads to the creation of efficient managerial contracts and incentives for minimising 
agency problems by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; John et 
al., 2010; Tang, 2012; Lin et al., 2012). Therefore, optimal contracting predicts a strong positive link 
between executive compensation and performance, due to the assumption that executives have less control 
in determining their pay (Kato, 1997; Dong et al., 2010; Aebi et al., 2012; Borisova et al., 2012).  
 In contrast, the managerial power view considers executive remuneration arrangements as a 
product of close interpersonal relationships and negotiations between powerful corporate executives, 
especially CEOs, and weak corporate boards, which leads to the creation of inefficient managerial contracts 
that exacerbates agency problems by increasing the divergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders (Sapp, 2008; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). As executives are assumed to set their own pay 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004; Van Essen et al., 2012), the managerial power view expects executive 
compensation not to be tied necessarily to corporate performance. 
The empirical literature on executive compensation is not only inconclusive, but also disproportionately 
concentrated in the UK and US (Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Main et al., 1996; Conyon, 1997; Blackwell et 
al., 2007; Lee et al., 2008; Zheng, 2010; Ozkan, 2011; Tang, 2012; Tian, 2013; Elsila et al., 2003).3 These 
studies generally report a positive, but a weak, link between executive pay and performance; although US 
studies document a relatively stronger pay and performance sensitivity than their UK counterparts (Conyon 
and Murphy, 2000; Sapp, 2008). Jensen and Murphy (1990) were amongst the pioneers to investigate the 
association between CEO compensation and share returns. They used a sample of 1,049 US firms from 
1974 to 1976, and reported a positive CEO pay and performance elasticity. Specifically, they reported that 
for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth, a US CEO‟s income increased by around $3.25. Main et 
al. (1996) reported a similar, but a weaker, finding for a sample of 60 UK companies from 1981 to 1989.  
However, early UK and US studies on executive compensation generally display a major limitation in 
that they include only a small number of control variables, especially CG mechanisms that can potentially 
affect the executive pay and corporate performance relationship. In response to the later problem, 
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subsequent and more recent UK (Conyon, 1997; Benito and Conyon, 1999; Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Ozkan, 
2011) and US (Mehran, 1995; Core et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2006; Tang, 2012; Lin et al., 2012) studies 
have mostly examined the executive pay and corporate performance sensitivity by controlling for a raft of 
CG variables, such as board and ownership characteristics. These studies generally report similar weak 
executive pay and corporate performance sensitivities. A limitation of these studies is that typically they 
also do not explicitly address the potential endogeneity problems that may arise from the possible 
simultaneous use of alternative CG mechanisms and executive pay by firms to contemporaneously 
minimise agency problems in a simultaneous equation framework. This may explain the noticeably weak 
executive pay and corporate performance coefficients that have been reported by past studies (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2004, 2006; Huang et al., 2012). 
 A small number of non UK and US studies have generally reported a positive and in contrast, a 
comparatively stronger, but less robust, association between executive pay and corporate performance. This 
indicates that the executive pay and corporate performance elasticity may not only differ due to company-
specific characteristics, but also due to country-level institutional and cultural features. For example, Sapp 
(2008) reports a positive and higher sensitivity between executive pay and corporate performance for 416 
Canadian firms from 2000 to 2005 compared with similar UK and US firms. Studies by Kaplan (1994), 
Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Kato (1997), Angel and Fumas (1997), and Brunello et al. (2001) using 
German, Japanese, Spanish and Italian companies, respectively, find a similar positive and relatively strong 
association between executive pay and corporate performance.  
Further, and of direct relevance, the results of a limited number of studies conducted in a number of 
developing countries are largely consistent with the non UK and US evidence. For instance, using a sample 
of 601 Chinese firms from 2000 to 2003, Buck et al. (2008) report a positive and higher sensitivity between 
CEO pay and total shareholder return than those reported for UK and US companies. Their results are also 
generally consistent with those of previous and recent Chinese studies by Kato et al. (2006), Firth et al. 
(2006, 2007), and Conyon and He (2011, 2012), as well as those conducted in the emerging markets of 
Bulgaria and India by Jones and Kato (1996) and Kumar and Kaura (2002), respectively. Due to an 
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apparent lack of sufficient data (Okeahalam, 2004; Ntim et al., 2012a, b), there is an acute lack of empirical 
evidence from Africa in general, and SA in particular. Our study, therefore, seeks to extend the existing 
literature to African context by investigating the association between total executive pay and corporate 
performance for a sample of SA listed companies within a unique simultaneous equation framework.  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1. Data Considerations 
Our sample is drawn from all 291 non-financial firms4 listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
(JSE) Ltd as at 31/12/2007. Table 1 presents a summary of the sample selection procedure.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Panel A in Table 1 shows the industrial composition of all non-financial firms that were listed on 
the JSE, whilst Panel B summarises the composition of the final sampled firms. The data used in this study 
are derived from two separate sources. The first is the total executive pay and CG data extracted from 
company annual reports downloaded from the Perfect Information Database. Unlike most prior studies that 
have focused purely on CEO pay (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Zheng, 2010), we collect data on the total pay 
of both the CEO and all other executives. The second source of the financial data is Datastream. Firms 
included in our final sample met two criteria: availability of a firm‟s executive pay data for all years from 
2003 to 2007 and the accessibility to a company‟s financial and CG data from 2002 to 2006.5  
These criteria were set for a number of reasons. First, the labour intensive nature of the manual 
collection of the executive pay and CG data introduced sample size limitations, and as such, we limited the 
sample to firms where consecutive year data were available. Second, and following previous studies (Core 
et al., 1999; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009), our criteria ensured that the conditions for a balanced panel 
analysis were satisfied.6 Third, examination of five-year data with both cross-sectional and time series 
properties may be useful in ascertaining whether the observed cross-sectional link between executive pay 
and corporate performance is robust over time.  
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Finally, the sample begins in 2002 because there is limited data coverage in the Perfect Information 
Database/Datastream on SA companies prior to that year, and crucially because King II came into effect in 
2002. The sample ends in 2007 because it is the most recent year for which data is available. As presented 
in Panel B of Table 1, the sample consists of a total of 169 firms out of the initial 291 firms7 over five firm-
years from eight industries that met the data criteria for our analysis.  
 
4.2. Model Specification: Executive Pay-Corporate Performance Sensitivity 
Total pay of all executives (TPAY) and the CEO (CEOPAY) are our main dependent variables, and 
following recent studies (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Blackwell et al., 2007; Ozkan, 2011; Tang, 2012), 
TPAY/CEOPAY is broadly defined as total cash (including base salaries, performance bonuses, pension 
contributions and others) and total non-cash or equity-based compensation (made up of granted shares, 
vested/exercised options8 and any other long-term incentive plans). The widely used total shareholder 
return (TSR) is our main corporate performance proxy, but as a robustness check, we also employ return on 
assets (ROA) and Tobin‟s Q (Q) as alternative accounting and market-based corporate performance 
measures, respectively.  
 Also, following past studies (Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2008; Jones and Wu, 
2010; Lin et al., 2012), we include a number of CG and financial variables as controls, including the 
number of board meetings (NBMs), director ownership (DOWN), director ownership squared (DOWN2) (to 
test for non-linear relationships), the presence of an independent remuneration committee (RCOM), CEO 
role duality (DUAL), firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), dividend payment 
status (DIV), sales growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CAPX), industry (INDUST)  and year (YD) dummies. 
Table 2 contains full definitions of all the variables used.   
    Insert Table 2 about here 
 As we estimate a lag structure, a fixed-effects model has the advantage of capturing unobservable 
firm-level differences, such as executive talent and firm complexity (Main et al., 1996; John et al., 2010;  
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Borisova et al., 2012), and as such we follow previous studies (Benito and Conyon, 1999; Sapp, 2008; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009) in estimating a fixed-effects model specified as follows: 
                               iiit
k
ki
j
jii CONTROLSCGTSRTPAY     617110             (1) 
where: TPAY/CEOPAY refers to total pay of all executive directors/total CEO pay; TSR is total shareholder 
return; CG refers to the corporate governance variables, including the number of board  meetings (NBM), 
director ownership (DOWN), director ownership squared (DOWN2), the presence of an independent 
remuneration committee (RCOM), CEO role  duality (DUAL), cross-listing (CROSLIST) and audit firm size 
(BIG4); CONTROLS refers to the control variables for sales growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CAPX), 
firm size (LNTA), dividend payment status (DIV), industry (INDUST); year (YD); and  refers to the firm-
specific fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of 168 dummy  variables to represent the 169 sampled firms. 
 
4.3. Three-Stage Least Squares, Executive Pay, Alternative Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Possible Interdependencies 
 
It has been suggested that the use of alternative CG mechanisms by companies in mitigating agency 
problems implies that they may need to interrelate (i.e., either as complements or substitutes) in order to be 
effective, and thus single equation regression models as specified in (1), for example, can lead to spurious 
coefficients (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Beiner et al., 2004, 2006). We attempt 
to address this criticism of previous studies by including five alternative CG mechanisms, namely board 
size (BSIZE), the percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs), leverage (LEV), block ownership 
(BLKOWN), and institutional ownership (INSOWN) (Table 2 fully defines these variables) in addition to 
TPAY/CEOPAY  and TSR to develop a system of seven simultaneous equations. We then use 3SLS 
technique to simultaneously estimate equations (2) to (7) along with equation (8) specified below.9  
 The rationale is to consider TPAY/CEOPAY as endogenous along with the CG variables, permitting 
each CG mechanism to affect TPAY/CEOPAY, but also allowing TPAY/CEOPAY to affect the choice of 
each CG mechanism. For example, activism by large institutional shareholders can effectively limit 
executive compensation despite increased corporate performance (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Dong and 
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Ozkan, 2008) and thus, the executive pay and corporate performance sensitivity may simultaneously 
depend on the percentage of INSOWN, and possibly the other CG variables. A description of how the 
system of seven equations10 is developed is presented in the following subsections: 4.3.1 to 4.3.7. 
 
4.3.1. Total shareholder return (TSR). Past CG studies (Brown and Caylor, 2009; Leung and Horwitz, 
2010) suggest that BSIZE, NEDs, LEV, BLKOWN and INSOWN do affect corporate performance, and as 
such we assume that TSR will be determined by the five CG mechanisms, together with TPAY/CEOPAY 
and the exogenous variables. Smaller firms have better growth opportunities (Beiner et al., 2004; Tang, 
2012), and thus we predict that firm size (LNTA) and audit firm size (BIG4) will be negatively related to 
TSR. Firms with greater investment opportunities tend to grow faster and are more likely to receive higher 
market valuation (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Ghosh, 2007), and hence we expect sales growth (SGR) 
and capital expenditure (CAPX) to be positively related to TSR. Dividend payment status (DIV) signals a 
healthy cash flow position (Beiner et al., 2006), whereas cross-listing (CROSLIST) indicates better future 
investment and growth opportunities (Ntim et al., 2012a), and therefore we hypothesise that DIV and 
CROSLIST will correlate positively with TSR. We expect TSR to vary across different industries (INDUST) 
and years (YD). We denote all eight exogenous variables together as EXOGENOUS, and therefore the first 
equation to be estimated in the system is specified as: 
             
ii
j
jii
iiiii
EXOGENOUSTP AYINSOWN
BLKOWNLEVNEDsBSIZETSR



 8165 43210                            (2) 
4.3.2. Board size (BSIZE). Corporate boards perform important functions, including monitoring, 
disciplining and compensating management to align their interests with those of shareholders (Beiner et al., 
2006; Ntim et al., 2012a). Increased communication and coordination problems associated with larger 
boards limits their effectiveness and this may be shown in the form of higher executive pay (Ozkan, 2011). 
In fact, Core et al. (1999), Sapp (2008) and Ozkan (2011), respectively, report that larger US, UK and 
Canadian boards pay their CEOs relatively more than their smaller counterparts, and hence board size 
(BSIZE) is employed as the dependent variable in the second equation in the system. Larger firms have 
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bigger boards and complex issues to address (Beiner et al., 2006), and as such we predict that firm size 
(LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST) and the number of board meetings (NBM) will be 
positively related to BSIZE.  
 Larger firms have lower growth and investment opportunities (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; 
Borisova et al., 2012), and thus we expect sales growth (SGR) and capital expenditure (CAPX) to correlate 
negatively with BSIZE. As larger firms are subjected to greater media and public scrutiny (Conyon, 1997; 
Ntim et al., 2012a), we hypothesise that BSIZE will be positively associated with the presence of an 
independent remuneration committee (RCOM) and a CG committee (CGCOM) (see Table 2), but 
negatively related to CEO role duality (DUAL) and director ownership (DOWN). We also expect BSIZE to 
vary across different industries (INDUST) and financial years (YD). Labelling all 12 exogenous variables 
together as EXOGENOUS, the second equation to be estimated in the system is specified as:  
                         
ii
j
jii
iiiii
EXOGENOUSTP AYINSOWN
BLKOWNLEVNEDsTSRBSIZE



 12165 43210                             (3) 
4.3.3. Percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs). Greater independence associated with non-executive 
directors (NEDs) potentially puts them in a better position to effectively prevent executives from 
expropriating shareholder wealth in the form of excessive compensation (Mehran, 1995; Leung and 
Horwitz, 2010; Huang et al., 2012). However, Core et al. (1999) and Ozkan (2011), respectively, report 
that US and UK companies with more NEDs paid their CEOs more than those with smaller NEDs, while 
the findings of Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) indicate that larger outside board representation leads to 
a reduction in the pay of US CEOs. King II encourages SA boards to have a majority of NEDs, and 
therefore the dependent variable of the third equation in the system is the percentage of NEDs.  
 Larger firms have greater visibility and are more attractive to prospective directors (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996), and as such it is hypothesised that NEDs will be positively related to firm size (LNTA), 
audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), the presence of an independent remuneration committee 
(RCOM) and a CG committee (CGCOM), but negatively associated with CEO role duality (DUAL) and 
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director ownership (DOWN). We predict that sales growth (SGR) and capital expenditure (CAPX) will 
correlate negatively with NEDs, as smaller companies have better growth and investment prospects 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). We also expect NEDs to vary across different industries (INDUST) and 
over-time (YD). Naming all 11 exogenous variables together as EXOGENOUS, the third equation to be 
estimated in the system is specified as:  
                           
ii
j
jii
iiiii
EXOGENOUSTP AYINSOWN
BLKOWNLEVBSIZETSRNEDs



 11165 43210                           (4) 
4.3.4. Leverage (LEV). Pas studies (Jensen, 1986; Cunat and Guadalupe, 2009; Lin et al., 2012) suggests 
that greater debt usage can serve as a good CG mechanism by reducing agency problems, such as perquisite 
consumption often associated with managers having excess cash flows, and therefore, leverage (LEV) is 
utilised as the dependent variable in the fourth equation in the system. As larger firms have greater agency 
problems, they can be expected to use more debt to induce extra monitoring by lenders (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Sun et al., 2009; Grundy and Li, 2010) and hence, we predict a positive relationship 
between LEV and firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), and cross-listing (CROSLIST).  
 Beiner et al. (2006) indicate that dividend payment signals the availability of internal funds as an 
alternative to debt financing, and thus we hypothesise a negative link between LEV and dividend payment 
status (DIV). Also, debt usage can increase financial distress and limits the capacity to utilise growth and 
investment opportunities (Jensen, 1986) and accordingly predicts that sales growth (SGR) and capital 
expenditure (CAPX) will relate negatively to LEV. We also expect debt usage to vary across different 
industries (INDUST) and years (YD). Labelling all eight exogenous variables together as EXOGENOUS, the 
fourth equation to be estimated in the system is specified as: 
                             
ii
j
jii
iiiii
EXOGENOUSTP AYINSOWN
BLKOWNNEDsBSIZETSRLEV



 8165 43210                         (5) 
4.3.5. Block ownership (BLKOWN). Greater block ownership (BLKOWN) can serve as a substitute for good 
CG mechanisms by limiting executive compensation (Ozkan, 2011; Connelly et al., 2012). Indeed, Mehran 
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(1995), Core et al. (1999), Sapp (2008) and Ozkan (2011) respectively, report that US, Canadian and UK 
firms with greater block ownership pay their CEOs significantly less, compared to those with smaller block 
ownership. Given the inherent pervasiveness of block ownership in SA, mainly due to complicated cross 
shareholdings and pyramidical structures (Barr et al., 1995; Armstrong et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a and 
b), we employ BLKOWN as the fifth dependent variable in the system.  
 Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that it is more attractive to invest in firms with higher growth 
and investment prospects, and thus we expect that sales growth (SGR) and capital expenditure (CAPX) will 
be positively associated with BLKOWN. We expect BLKOWN to be negatively related to firm size (LNTA), 
the presence of a remuneration committee (RCOM) and a CG committee (CGCOM), but to correlate 
positively with director ownership (DOWN) and CEO role duality (DUAL), as it costs more to buy a portion 
of a larger firm (Ang et al., 2002; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006). We also predict that 
BLKOWN will vary across different industries (INDUST) and years (YD). Referring to all nine exogenous 
variables together as EXOGENOUS, the fifth equation to be estimated in the system is specified as: 
                         
ii
j
jii
iiiii
EXOGENOUSTP AYINSOWN
LEVNEDsBSIZETSRBLKOWN



 9165 43210                             (6) 
4.3.6. Institutional ownership (INSOWN). Greater activism and monitoring by institutional shareholders can 
improve the executive pay and performance sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Tang, 2012; Ntim et al., 
2012a). However, while Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Dong and Ozkan (2008), respectively, report that 
US and UK companies with greater institutional ownership paid their CEOs significantly less than those 
with smaller institutional ownership, the results of Zheng (2010) suggest that institutional ownership has no 
impact on CEO compensation in a sample of US firms. However, King II urges institutional shareholders to 
play active roles in setting executive pay in SA firms and hence, the dependent variable in the sixth 
equation of the system is institutional ownership (INSOWN).  
Beiner et al. (2006) suggest that it is more profitable to hold shares in firms with better growth and 
investment opportunities, and thus sales growth (SGR) and capital expenditure (CAPX) are hypothesised to 
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relate positively to INSOWN. Larger firms are attractive to institutions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Lin et 
al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a) and thus, INSOWN is expected to be positively associated with firm size 
(LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), the presence of a remuneration committee 
(RCOM) and a CG committee (CGCOM), but to be negatively linked to CEO role duality (DUAL). We also 
expect INSOWN to vary across different industries (INDUST) and years (YD). Labelling all 10 exogenous 
variables together as EXOGENOUS, the sixth equation to be estimated in the system is specified as: 
                         
ii
j
jii
iiiii
EXOGENOUSTP AYBLKOWN
LEVNEDsBSIZETSRINSOWN



 10165 43210                            (7) 
4.3.7. Total executive/CEO pay (TPAY/CEOPAY), corporate performance (TSR) and CG Mechanisms. To 
examine the association between total executive/CEO pay (TPAY/CEOPAY), corporate performance (TSR) 
and the CG mechanisms, TPAY/CEOPAY is employed as the dependent variable in the final equation in the 
system. We also add all the control variables included in equation (1), which are combined as CONTROLS. 
Therefore, the final equation to be estimated in the system is specified as:  
                         
ii
j
jii
iiiii
CONTROLSINSOWNBLKOWN
LEVNEDsBSIZETSRTP AY



 12165 43210                         (8) 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics of the two main components of total executive pay for all firm-years, 
as well as for each of the five firm-years. Panels A and B report statistics relating to total and average pay of 
all executives (TPAY), respectively, while Panel C presents similar figures for the CEO (CEOPAY). The 
table indicates that TPAY and CEOPAY have generally increased considerably over the five-year period 
investigated. The mean total CEOPAY increased by about 92% from R1.89m ($0.22m) in 2003 to R3.64m 
($0.42m) in 2007, suggesting an approximate annual growth rate11 of 18%. This appears to support the 
widely held view, especially within the SA financial press (Okeahalam, 2004; Sarra, 2004; Ntim et al., 
2012a) that corporate executives continue to receive substantial pay increases that are well above the 
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average national growth rate in pay. Similar growth and distribution patterns can be observed for the total 
and average pay of all executive directors presented in Panels A and B of Table 3, respectively. However, 
the level of an average pay of a corporate executive is observably lower than that of an average pay of a 
CEO. For example, and on average, CEOs receive about R1m ($0.12m) more in total compensation than 
the average corporate executive with the statistics exhibiting greater variability in average CEO pay than 
average corporate executive pay. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
We note that whilst the absolute levels of top executive pay in SA are relatively lower than those 
reported in developed countries, such as the UK and US (Main et al., 1996; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; 
Zheng, 2010; Ozkan, 2011; Cook and Burress, 2013; Elsila et al., 2013; Kabir et al., 2013), evidence of 
increasing levels of executive pay is generally consistent with their results. Noticeably, and despite King 
II‟s suggestion that equity should form a larger part of executives pay in order to align their interests with 
those of shareholders, total cash pay continue to form a substantial portion of total executive pay. For 
instance, the average total non-cash pay of all executive directors of R1.61m ($0.19m) is only 13% of the 
average total pay of R12.89m ($1.49m). However, it is noticeable that in spite of accounting for a small 
proportion of total executive pay, average total non-cash pay is on the increase, and in the case of CEOPAY, 
has even grown considerably faster (over 20% annually) than total CEO cash pay.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the endogenous (Panel A) and exogenous (Panel B) 
variables used. All values generally indicate a wide spread. For example, and similar to the findings of 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), total shareholder return (TSR) ranges from -48% to 236% with an 
average of 28%, indicating that most of the sampled firms are profitable.12 The median board size (BSIZE) 
of 10 is lower than a corresponding number of 13 reported by Core et al. (1999) for a sample of US firms, 
while the average of 57% non-executive directors (NEDs) is in line with the 62% reported by Lee et al. 
(2008) for a sample of US companies. The mean institutional ownership (INSOWN) of 74% is consistent 
with the 63% reported by Zheng (2010) for a sample of US firms, whereas the average block ownership 
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(BLKOWN) of 62% is considerably higher than the 20% reported by Ozkan (2011) for a sample of UK 
firms. CEO age ranges from a minimum of 34 years to a maximum of 76 years with an average of 55 years. 
This supports previous evidence that CEOs, on average, tend to be matured and experienced individuals 
(Ozkan, 2011; Elsila et al., 2013). Similarly, CEO tenure ranges between a minimum of zero (less than six 
months) and maximum of 28 years with median tenure of six and half years, and thereby providing support 
for the similar findings of past studies (Ozkan, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Cook and Burress, 2013). 
Strikingly, on average, only 14% of our sampled firms have independent remuneration committee 
(RCOM), far lower than the 66% reported by Brown and Caylor (2009) for a sample of US companies. In 
contrast, the descriptive statistics indicate that 23% (77%) have combined (separated) the roles of CEO and 
Chairman (DUAL); a figure close to the 18% (82%) found by Conyon and Murphy (2000) for a sample of 
UK companies. The other endogenous and exogenous variables all show wide variation, suggesting that the 
sample is sufficiently made up of a mixture of small and large firms, and thus minimises any incidences of 
sample selection bias (Livne et al., 2013; O‟Connor et al., 2013; Shen and Zhang, 2013). 
 
5.2. Executive Pay and Corporate Performance Sensitivity 
5.2.1. Results based on estimating firm fixed-effects. Table 5 contains a fixed-effects regression of cash, 
non-cash and total executive pay on corporate performance, as proxied by TSR and the control variables. 
Columns 2 to 4 present results relating to the total pay of all executive directors (TPAY), whereas Columns 
5 to 7 report similar estimates for the CEO (CEOPAY).  The results generally show that there is a positive 
and significant (at least at the 5% level) association between corporate performance and executive pay in 
SA, but consistent with the findings of past studies, the coefficients are small, ranging from 0.025 for cash 
pay of TPAY to 0.098 for total CEOPAY. Conyon (1997) and Ozkan (2011), respectively, report share 
returns and CEO pay sensitivity of 0.061 and 0.095 for samples of UK firms. Similarly, Hubbard and Palia 
(1995) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) respectively, report TSR and CEO compensation sensitivity of 0.099 
and 0.093 for samples of US companies. Noticeably, and on average, the link between equity-based 
executive pay and corporate performance is stronger than for cash-based pay.  
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 For example, while the association between TSR and total cash pay of all executives is 0.025, that 
with non-cash pay is higher at 0.054, implying that a 10% increase in TSR will be associated with only a 
0.25% increase in executive directors‟ cash-based pay, but a 0.54% increase in their equity-based pay, 
ceteris paribus. This provides support to the recommendations of King II and the findings of previous 
studies (Main et al., 1996; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Ozkan, 2011), which report a higher relationship 
between share returns and non-cash CEO compensation than CEO cash pay. This finding is not 
theoretically surprising as equity-based pay, such as stocks and options, are more tied to corporate fortunes 
than cash-based compensation, such as salaries and pension contributions that are most often predetermined 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999; Berger et al., 2013) and less sensitive to performance.  
A major implication of this finding is that the structure rather than the levels of pay appears to be 
more effective in linking executive/CEO pay to corporate performance. This is because whereas the 
absolute levels of non-cash pay (see Table 3) are far lower than those of cash pay, it appears to have a 
stronger link with corporate performance than cash pay. The results in Table 5 also suggest that irrespective 
of the compensation proxy used, the association between TSR and CEOPAY appears to be stronger than that 
with TPAY. This offers empirical support to the findings of Sapp (2008) and Tang (2012) for samples of 
Canadian and US companies, respectively.  
One explanation is that CEOs perform larger and strategic roles with a higher possibility of being 
dismissed following poor corporate performance than lower placed executives (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; 
Blackwell et al., 2007; Tiani, 2013), and consequently CEO pay is expected to be higher and more tied to 
corporate performance to compensate for the associated extra responsibilities and risks. It is also consistent 
with tournament theory (Sapp, 2008; Lee et al., 2008; Zhao, 2013), which suggests that CEOs are paid 
more to stimulate healthy competition among lower placed executives for the position of the CEO, 
ultimately resulting in the exertion of greater effort and improved corporate performance.  
The coefficients on most of the control variables in Table 5 also show the expected signs. For 
instance, firm size (LNTA) and audit firm size (BIG4) are significant and positively related to 
TPAY/CEOPAY with relatively larger coefficients, as expected, providing support to the widely 
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documented evidence that firm size is the single most important determinant of executive pay (Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000; Jones and Wu, 2010; John et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2012). The theory that larger firms are 
more complex to manage, implies the need for higher quality managers capable of making frequent and 
significant decisions, but such talented managers are both scarce and highly mobile who can largely be 
attracted with competitive pay packages (Murphy, 1999; Sapp, 2008). Consistent with past studies 
(Mehran, 1995; Core et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2012), our results show that director 
ownership (DOWN) is associated with significantly lower executive/CEO compensation, suggesting an 
alignment of executive interests with those of shareholders that minimises managerial expropriation.  
However, we do not find any evidence of a significant non-monotonic link between director 
ownership squared (DOWN2) and executive/CEO pay as reported by Lee et al. (2008) and Ozkan (2011). 
The results also indicate that the presence of an independent remuneration committee (RCOM) impacts 
negatively on executive/CEO pay, indicating that independence of the committee improves executive 
monitoring (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Dong et al., 2010). This is also in line with the suggestions 
of King II, as well as the findings of Conyon (1997) and Sapp (2008) for samples of UK and Canadian 
firms, respectively. The significant and positive association between CEO duality (DUAL) and CEO non-
cash pay/total (CEOPAY) implies that firms that combine the roles of CEO and chairman pay their CEOs 
more, offering support to the recommendations of King II and the results of Core et al. (1999), but 
inconsistent with those of Benito and Conyon (1999) who find a statistically insignificant association 
between DUAL and CEO pay. In theory, higher CEO pay reflects extra responsibilities associated with role 
duality and also increased influence of the CEO over the board and remuneration committee (Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000; Sun et al., 2009; Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013).  
As expected, the results indicate that higher capital expenditure (CAPX) and dividend payment 
(DIV) impact negatively on executive/CEO pay, implying that the two corporate decisions reduce cash 
flows available to managers to expropriate in the form of excessive compensation (Jensen, 1986; Beiner et 
al., 2006), but that faster growing firms (SGR) appear to pay their executives significantly more, to 
presumably reward them for their superior managerial initiative and the company‟s improved cash flow 
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position. Consistent with the findings of Sapp (2008) for a sample of Canadian firms, our results suggest 
that cross-listed (CROSLIST) firms paid their executives/CEOs significantly more than their non-cross-
listed counterparts. The increased firm size and complexity of operations usually associated with cross-
listing, in theory, requires lucrative pay packages to successfully attract managers of international quality 
(Sapp, 2008; Tang, 2012; Elsila et al., 2013; Kabir et al., 2013; Livne et al., 2013).  
In contrast to the results of Core et al. (1999), we do not find any evidence that a busier corporate 
board, as measured by the number of board meetings (NBM), significantly impacts positively or negatively 
on executive/CEO pay. Finally, and unlike Conyon and Murphy (2000), Sapp (2008), Shen and Zhang 
(2013), Tiani (2013), Wesep and Wang (2013), our results (which are not reported, but available on 
request) do not suggest any significant differences in executive/CEO pay across different industries 
(INDUST). We do, however, find evidence of significant differences in pay across different years (YD) with 
executive/CEO pay being highest (displaying the largest significant coefficient) in 2007. 
  
5.2.2. Results based on the 3SLS and alternative corporate   performance proxies. As previously noted, past 
studies have estimated executive pay and performance sensitivity by using single equation modelling as 
specified in equation (1), for example, without taking into account possible simultaneities among the 
variables within a simultaneous equation framework, and potentially leading either to endogenous 
associations (Gil-Alana et al., 2010; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) or misleading coefficients (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). Unlike OLS, 3SLS uses generalised least squares to estimate robust 
coefficients by controlling for cross-equation correlation among the errors (Gujarati, 2003; Lee et al., 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2010), and thereby allows each mechanism to simultaneously affect executive pay, but also 
permitting executive pay to affect each mechanism (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 
1998; Ghosh, 2007). Thus, to adequately account for the presence of such potential endogenous links, we 
estimate equations (2) to (8) as a system of simultaneous equations that allows for possible simultaneous 
interrelationships among TPAY/CEOPAY, TSR and the five CG variables using 3SLS.  
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 However, to be certain that the 3SLS methodology is appropriate, we first test for the existence of 
endogenous or simultaneous links among executive pay, performance, and the five CG variables using the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (see Beiner et al., 2006, p. 27 for a detailed description of the procedure). 
Applied to equation (8), the test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 1% level. Therefore, we 
conclude that the 3SLS technique is appropriate and that our initial results from equation (1) may be 
misleading (in terms of bias and inconsistency). 
 Tables 6 and 7 contain results from estimating (2) to (8) as a system of simultaneous equations 
using 3SLS.13 Table 6 reports results relating to TPAY, whilst Table 7 presents similar findings for 
CEOPAY.  Most importantly, the coefficients on TPAY and CEOPAY reported in Column 8 in both tables, 
remain positive and statistically significant. It is also clearly observable that, irrespective of the executive 
pay measure used, the link between TSR and TPAY/CEOPAY has considerably improved. For example, the 
association between TSR and CEOPAY has increased from 0.098 for the single equation model in Table 5 
to 0.197 for the simultaneous equation model in Table 7.  
 While this difference is not substantially large compared to those reported by other studies (Main et 
al., 1996; Conyon, 1997; Firth et al., 2006; Sapp, 2008; Lin et al., 2012; Tang, 2012), it at least suggests 
that allowing for the existence of possible simultaneous interdependencies among TPAY/CEOPAY, TSR and 
the CG mechanisms results in an improvement in the executive pay and corporate performance elasticity. In 
addition, the findings reported in Column 8 of Tables 6 and 7 indicate that larger boards (BSIZE) pay their 
executives significantly more. This supports the results of Core et al. (1999) and Ozkan (2011) and is also 
consistent with the interpretation that larger boards are a sign of weak CG in the form of poor monitoring 
and disciplining of managers, resulting in managerial expropriation through excessive executive pay.  
 In contrast, the results suggest that greater debt usage (LEV) and higher institutional ownership 
(INSOWN) are associated with significantly lower TPAY/CEOPAY, providing support to the results of John 
et al. (2010) and Hartzell and Starks (2003), respectively. Theoretically, debt usage induces extra 
managerial monitoring by creditors in addition to reducing the agency problem of expropriation of „free 
cash flows‟ by opportunistic managers (Jensen, 1986; Beiner et al., 2006; Ghosh, 2007; Aebi et al., 2011). 
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Similarly, due to their information and knowledge advantages, institutional shareholders can mitigate 
agency problems by engaging in greater managerial monitoring and disciplining that can lead to lower 
executive compensation (Dong and Ozkan, 2008; Zheng, 2010; Lin et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2012). 
 The findings reported in Tables 6 and 7 further suggest significant interdependencies (either 
complementarities or substitutabilities) among TPAY/CEOPAY, TSR and the five CG variables, providing 
support for our simultaneous equation design, as well as highlighting the need for future researchers to take 
into account a comprehensive set of CG mechanisms within a simultaneous equation framework, when 
estimating the executive pay and corporate performance link. For instance, the results reported in Column 2 
of both tables show that the coefficient on TPAY/CEOPAY is positive and significant, implying that better 
corporate performance is not only associated with higher pay, but that there is also a reverse association 
(i.e., higher executive pay also seems to motivate managers to strive for better corporate performance).  
 Additionally, the findings presented in Column 2 of both tables indicate that BSIZE, NEDs and 
INSOWN impact positively on TSR, whereas LEV and BLKOWN are negatively related to corporate 
performance. Within the SA corporate context, while larger boards may be weak at monitoring executives, 
they are likely to be better placed to attract critical resources, such as finance, business contracts and 
contacts that may enhance corporate performance (Okeahalam, 2004; Ntim et al., 2012a). The presence of 
NEDs improves board independence and monitoring (Leung and Horwitz, 2010; John et al., 2010) whereas, 
due to their larger ownership stake and greater financial strength, higher INSOWN reduces agency problems 
through greater managerial monitoring (Hartzell and Starks, 2003, Ozkan, 2011). The significant negative 
relationship between TSR and LEV does not support the „free cash flow‟ and capital structure theories 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006), but appears to suggest that greater use of debt increases 
financial stress and reduces a firm‟s capacity to exploit profitable growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986), 
whilst the negative link between TSR and BLKOWN implies that block owners can collaborate with 
managers to expropriate corporate resources at the expense of minority shareholders (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006; Borisova et al., 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Berger et al., 2013). 
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 Consistent with our expectations, the results reported in Column 3 of Tables 6 and 7 indicate that 
BSIZE is significant and positively related to TSR, NEDs, TPAY/CEOPAY, LEV and INSOWN. This reveals 
the existence of reverse associations among BSIZE, TSR and TPAY/CEOPAY, as well as suggesting that 
BSIZE, NEDs, INSOWN and LEV are complementary CG mechanisms. The findings contained in Column 4 
of both tables show that NEDs are positively associated with BSIZE and LEV, providing further support for 
the presence of simultaneous complementarities among them, as larger boards will invariably lead to higher 
proportion of NEDs with better capacity and reputation to raise and use more debt.  
 In line our with our expectations, the results in Column 5 of both Tables 6 and 7 suggest that LEV 
is negatively related to TSR, but positively associated with BSIZE and NEDs, supporting the existence of a 
reverse substitutive link between LEV and TSR (i.e., higher debt usage is associated with lower corporate 
performance, but also more profitable firms appear to use less debt), but reverse complementary 
associations among LEV, BSIZE and NEDs. Consistent with predictions, the findings presented in Column 
6 of both tables indicate that BLKOWN is positively related to INSOWN, implying that because it costs 
more to buy shares in larger firms, block shareholders are more likely to be institutions (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006; Connelly et al., 2012; Wesep and Wang, 2013; Zhao, 2013).  
 In contrast, the reverse positive link between BLKOWN and LEV is not consistent with our 
expectation that firms with a dominant block owner are less likely to use debt. The results reported in 
Column 7 of both Tables 6 and 7 suggest that INSOWN is positively related to TSR, BSIZE and BLKOWN, 
but negatively associated with TPAY/CEOPAY, indicating the existence of a reverse substitutability link 
between INSOWN and TPAY/CEOPAY (i.e., greater INSOWN appears to be associated with lower 
TPAY/CEOPAY, but also firms that pay their executives lower seem to have higher INSOWN). Also, the 
coefficients on the exogenous variables reported in both tables generally depict the predicted signs. For 
example, CROSLIST, DIV and SGR are positively related to TSR, whereas LNTA and CAPX are negatively 
related to TSR as expected. The signs of the coefficients on the exogenous variables for BSIZE, NEDs, LEV, 
BLKOWN, INSOWN and TPAY/CEOPAY are generally in line with our theoretical expectations. 
6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
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To examine the robustness of our results, we conduct a number of additional analyses, primarily regarding 
the use of alternative corporate performance measures (ROA and Q), alternative econometric methods 
(estimating a generalised method of moments – GMM, and testing for changes and interaction effects), the 
use of an alternative CG proxy (incorporating a composite CG index - CGI), and including additional 
control variables (CEO age – CEOAGE, and CEO tenure - CTENURE).14  
 First, to ascertain whether our results are sensitive to the corporate performance proxy used, we re-
run equation (1) using return on assets (ROA) and Tobin‟s Q (Q) as accounting and market based 
alternative corporate performance measures, respectively, which have been used widely within the 
executive compensation literature (Mehran, 1995; Lee et al., 2008; Sapp, 2008; Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009; Elsila et al., 2013), and are considered to be appropriate. Table 8 contains estimated results 
based on ROA, whilst Table 9 reports findings based on Q. Although, a number of minor sensitivities can 
be observed with regard to the magnitude of some of the coefficients, the results in both tables are 
essentially similar to those reported in Table 5 for TSR, suggesting that our results are fairly robust.  
A particularly interesting comparison shows that irrespective of the executive pay proxy used, the 
results suggest that there is a stronger link between TPAY/CEOPAY and ROA than with Q or TSR. This is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Core et al., 1999) and 
indicates that accounting profits are more directly related to executive pay than market performance. The 
signs and significance of the coefficients on the control variables reported in Tables 8 and 9 remain 
virtually the same as those reported in Table 5. For instance, the coefficients on CAPX, DOWN and RCOM 
contained in Tables 8 and 9 remain significant and negatively related to TPAY/CEOPAY, whereas 
CROSLIST, SGR and LNTA are still significant and positively associated with TPAY/CEOPAY. 
 Second, it has been suggested that it is difficult to obtain appropriate instruments that can be used 
in estimating our system of 3SLS that can adequately address the presence of potential endogeneity 
problems (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, b; Van Lent, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). 
Therefore, one way of avoiding such potential endogeneity problems when estimating the pay-for-
performance elasticity is to run the regression using changes in the variables rather than levels (Jensen and 
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Murphy, 1990; Morey et al., 2009; Conyon and He, 2011, 2012).  The main advantage of this approach is 
that estimating first-differences of the variables can eliminate any firm-specific hetereogeneities, and 
thereby allowing a much more precise estimation of the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Hence, we re-
estimate equation (1) by using changes instead of levels of the executive compensation and performance 
variables. Statistically significant and positive effect of the ∆TSR on ∆CEOPAY is discernible in Model 1 of 
Table 10, thereby implying that our evidence of a positive association between CEOPAY and TSR is not 
significantly sensitive to endogeneity problems that may arise from firm-specific hetereogeneities. The 
noticeable decrease in the coefficient (0.020) on the ∆TSR compared with the one (0.098) on the TSR in 
Model 6 of Table 5 is generally consistent with previous evidence that suggests that first-differenced 
variables tend to predict TSR less strongly than their levels counterparts (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Morey 
et al ., 2009; Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Elsila et al., 2013).  
Third, although we have made explicit efforts at mitigating potential endogeneity problems 
regarding the association between executive compensation and corporate performance by estimating fixed-
effects and lagged structure models, Wintoki et al. (2012) suggest that the relationship may still be 
confounded by the presence of dynamic endogeneity. In particular, the dynamic endogeneity problem arises 
if future values of our corporate performance measure (TSR) may be influenced by current values of the 
executive pay proxy (CEOPAY), which in turn may be associated with past values of the TSR. Whereas it 
has been widely assumed that estimating fixed-effects can address such endogeneity problems (i.e., 
unobserved hetereogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity), it has been demonstrated recently that 
if our explanatory variable (TSR) is related to past values of our dependent variable (CEOPAY), then 
implementing the fixed-effects estimation procedure may produce biased coefficients (Guest, 2009; 
Wooldridge, 2010; Mangena et al., 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012; Elsila et al., 2013; Fosu, 2013).     
Thus, Wintoki et al. (2012) suggest that the above econometric problems relating to unobserved 
hetereogeneity, dynamic endogeneity, and simultaneity can be resolved by using a dynamic panel GMM 
estimator. Briefly, this dynamic panel GMM estimator was developed in series of studies by Holtz-Eakin et 
al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Arellano and Bond (1998). Wintoki 
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et al. (2012) indicate that the GMM estimator has at least three advantages over traditional OLS or fixed-
effects estimator. First, and distinct from ordinary least square (OLS) estimator, the GMM estimator has the 
capacity to capture firm-level fixed-effects, and thereby adequately addressing any potential endogeneities 
that may arise from unobserved firm specific hetereogeneities. Second, and different from traditional fixed-
effects estimator that assumes strong exogeneity (i.e., not robust to autocorrelation and hetereoscedascity) 
between current and past values, the GMM estimator permits current values of the explanatory variable 
(i.e., TSR) to be affected by past values of the dependent variable (i.e., CEOPAY). Finally, distinct from 
both OLS and fixed-effects estimators, if the economic structure and process underlying the generation of 
the variables is dynamic – in our case, if current values of the TSR variables are related to past values of the 
CEOPAY, then a GMM estimator can make it possible to use past values of the dependent and independent 
variables as valid instruments to adequately account for the presence of potential dynamic and simultaneous 
endogeneities. Hence, a key advantage of the GMM estimator is that it relies on internal instruments 
derived from historical values of the dependent and independent variables to be used, and thereby crucially 
eliminating the need for external instruments. 
Consequently, we employ a dynamic GMM estimator to re-regress the link between executive pay 
and corporate performance to accurately account for the existence of potential dynamic and simultaneous 
endogeneities. In particular, we use the two-step difference-GMM estimator developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) to re-estimate the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The primary procedure is made up of two 
steps. First, we take first differences of the TSR, CEOPAY, and CG/control variables to remove any bias 
that may arise from firm specific unobserved hetereogeneities. Second, we re-estimate equation (1) in the 
first differenced form using lagged values of the TSR, CEOPAY, and CG/control variables as instruments 
for current changes in the same set of variables. This also involves including past values of the dependent 
variable (CEOPAY) as part of the explanatory variables, and given our relatively limited dataset, the 
variables are instrumented with up to two lags of their own levels. Statistically significant and positive 
association between the TSR and CEOPAY is observable in Model 2 of Table 10, suggesting that our 
evidence is robust to the presence of potential dynamic and simultaneous endogeneity pr
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respect to the specification tests, the p-value of the AR(1) test suggests that autocorrelation is present in the 
first-differenced regression residuals, implying that the inclusion of the first lag of our dependent variable 
(CEOPAY) in our model seems appropriate. However, the p-value of the AR(2) test indicates that the null 
hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected. Further, both the Sargan (not robust to 
hetereoscedasticity) and Hansen (robust to hetereoscedasticity) tests of over-identification restrictions fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Similarly, the difference-in-Hansen test of 
exogeneity of the instruments does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous.   
Fourth, it has been argued that the pay-for-performance sensitivity may be strengthened or 
weakened depending on the quality of CG, implying that CG may have an interaction effect on the 
connection between TSR and CEOPAY (Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Michiels et al., 2013). That is, in 
firms with better governance and monitoring structures, the pay-performance nexus may be expected to be 
strong and vice-versa. Therefore, to test for potential interaction effects of CG on the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, re-estimate equation (1) by including interaction variables between our performance proxy 
(TSR) and each of the other five alternative CG variables (TSR*BSIZE, TSR*NEDs, TSR*LEV, 
TSR*BLKOWN, and TSR*INSOWN). Additionally, we include each alternative CG variables (BSIZE, 
NEDs, LEV, BLKOWN, and INSOWN) on its own in our interaction effects model. Statistically significant 
and positive effect of the TSR on the CEOPAY in Model 3 of Table 10 is easily discernible. Observably, the 
pay-for-performance sensitivity has increased from 0.098 in Model 6 of Table 5 to 0.125 in Model 3 of 
Table 10, implying that interacting our CG variables with our performance measure appears to have 
enhanced the pay-performance nexus. More precisely, BSIZE has a significant positive influence on the link 
between executive pay and performance, whereas NEDs and INSOWN have a significant negative effect on 
the same association. 
Fifth, Larcker and Rusticus (2007) suggest that CG is a complex concept with different aspects. It 
is, therefore, difficult for single CG mechanisms, such as BSIZE, NEDs, BLKOWN, and INSOWN to fully 
capture the varied aspects of CG on their own, and thereby leading to potential endogeneity problems 
arising mainly from measurement errors. One way of addressing potential endogeneity problems that may 
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be caused by such measurement errors is to construct a broad or composite CG index that incorporates 
different aspects of CG, such as board and directors issues, ownership issues, anti-takeover issues, and 
accounting and transparency issues, amongst others (Beiner et al., 2006; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007; 
Morey et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a). To address potential endogeneity problems that may arise from 
such measurement errors, we re-estimate equation (1) by including a broad CG index (CGI) containing 50 
individual CG provisions extracted from the 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for SA relating to 
five different governance aspects, namely: (i) board and directors; (ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) risk 
management, internal audit and control; (iv) encouraging voluntary and enforcement; and (v) integrated 
sustainability reporting issues (non-financials issues). The detailed CG provisions are contained in the 
Appendix of Ntim et al. (2012a, p. 102). Statistically significant and positive effect of the TSR on the 
CEOPAY is noticeable in Model 4 of Table 10, which also contains the CGI, implying that our previous 
evidence of positive effect of TSR on CEOPAY seems robust to potential endogeneous problems that may 
arise from measurement errors. Noticeably, the CGI also has a statistically significant and positive (0.136) 
effect on the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Further, we include the CGI in both our changes and 
interaction effects models (Models 5 and 6 of Table 10, respectively) with the findings remaining 
essentially the same as those in Models 1 and 3 of Table 10, respectively.  
Finally, prior studies suggest that CEO age and tenure can influence the level of CEO pay (Ozkan, 
2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Cook and Burress, 2013; Elsila et al., 2013). We, therefore, re-estimate 
equation (1) by including CEO age (CEOAGE) and CEO tenure (CTENURE) as additional control variables 
in Model 7 of Table 10, with the evidence suggesting a statistically significant and positive effect of the 
TSR on the CEOPAY. Further, consistent with the findings of past studies (Ozkan, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013; Cook and Burress, 2013), the coefficients on both CEOAGE, and CTENURE are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that older and long-serving CEOs received significantly higher pay than 
their younger and less experienced counterparts. Overall, the additional analyses suggest that our results are 
robust to different forms of endogeneity problems, including unobserved dynamic hetereogeneity and 
simultaneity, as well as different alternative executive pay, CG and performance proxies.  
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the association between executive pay and corporate performance, as measured by 
total shareholder return using a sample of South African (SA) listed firms, by uniquely taking into account 
a comprehensive set of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms within a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
simultaneous equation framework. We examine the link between cash and non-cash or equity-based 
compensation, as well as the association between both total CEO pay and corporate performance and 
between the total pay of all executives and corporate performance.  
 Consistent with past studies (Conyon, 1997; Murphy, 1999; Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Lin et al., 
2012; Tiani, 2013), our results based on estimating a conventional single equation model indicate that the 
executive pay and corporate performance elasticity is relatively small, ranging from 0.025 for cash 
compensation of all executives to 0.098 for total (cash and equity) CEO pay, and implies that the 2002 
King Report‟s (King II) attempt at linking executive pay more closely to performance has not been 
completely successful. We also find that the executive pay and performance sensitivity is stronger for 
equity-based pay than for cash-based compensation, providing support to the results of previous studies 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Ozkan, 2011; Huang et al., 2012; Conyony and He, 
2011, 2012). In addition, the results indicate that CEO pay is more sensitive to performance than those of 
lower placed executives, consistent with the relatively risky and strategic nature of the CEO post (Ang et 
al., 2002; Sapp, 2008; Sun et al., 2009; Tan, 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Elsila et al., 2013).  
Distinct from existing studies, the results based on estimating a 3SLS regression within a 
simultaneous equation model that dynamically allows for simultaneous interdependencies by taking into 
account a number of CG mechanisms, including board size, percentage of non-executive directors, 
leverage, block ownership and institutional ownership, generally suggest improved executive pay and 
corporate performance sensitivity, ranging between 0.163 for total pay of all executive directors and 0.197 
for total CEO compensation. Our results appear to justify our research design, as well as highlighting the 
need for future research to take into account a comprehensive set of CG mechanisms within a simultaneous 
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equation framework, which permits each mechanism to affect executive pay, but also allows executive pay 
to affect each mechanism when estimating the executive pay and corporate performance sensitivity.  
In fact, our 3SLS results suggest the existence of significant simultaneous interdependencies among 
executive pay, corporate performance and the CG mechanisms, including the existence of a reverse 
association between executive pay and corporate performance (i.e., evidence that better performing firms 
pay their executives higher, but also that highly paid executives appear to work harder to generate higher 
performance). The 3SLS results also show that higher institutional ownership and debt usage are associated 
with lower executive pay, consistent with institutional shareholders‟ and creditors‟ role in reducing agency 
problems by engaging in extra managerial monitoring. In addition, we find that larger boards pay their 
executives significantly more, evidence which is consistent with larger boards being a sign of weak CG in 
the form of poor communication, decision-making and managerial monitoring. The results are generally 
robust across a raft of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneities, including 
unobserved hetereogeneity, simultaneity, and firm-level dynamic fixed-effects, as well as different types of 
executive pay and corporate performance proxies. 
In conclusion, while our study contributes to the extant literature with particular regard to SA, our 
findings also have important policy and regulatory implications for both SA and more generally. Evidence 
of a stronger link between corporate performance and equity-based compensation provides support to the 
recommendations of King II that non-cash pay should form a substantial portion of total executive 
compensation in order to align executive interests with those of shareholders. However, evidence of a 
limited use of equity-based pay, especially CEO pay, compared with cash-based compensation suggests 
that compliance and enforcement may need to be further strengthened. Apart from regulatory enforcement, 
our results further indicate that greater activism by institutional shareholders may help strengthen the 
executive pay and corporate performance link.  
Finally, whilst our evidence is important and robust, some caveats are deemed appropriate. Due to 
data limitations, our analysis is restricted to five alternative CG mechanisms. As data coverage improves, 
future studies may need to consider other CG mechanisms, such as data on the market for corporate control, 
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in estimating the executive pay and corporate performance sensitivity. Different types of institutional 
owners exist, such as active, short-term, long-term, government, foreign, and domestic institutional owners. 
It would have, therefore, been appropriate to have examined how different institutional owners influence 
the pay-for-performance sensitivity. However, due to lack of data, we have been unable to do test such a 
relationship. Therefore, future research may improve their findings by investigating how different types of 
institutional owners influence the pay-for-performance elasticity. Similarly, due to data limitations, our 
total CEO pay measure does not include a CEO‟s change in wealth arising from stock ownership and 
dividends. Incorporating such changes in CEO wealth in the total CEO pay package by future researchers 
may enhance their findings. Finally, due to data access problems, our sample period is limited to pre-2008 
financial crisis, which was largely a rising or “bull‟s” market. However, during the 2008 global financial 
crisis, a large number of stock markets, especially those in the developed countries suffered large falls in 
stock prices, resulting in a falling or “bear‟s” market. Thus, it is possible for the pay-performance link to be 
weaker in a “bear‟s” market, but stronger in a “bull‟s” market. Future research may, therefore, improve the 
insights from their empirical findings by replicating our results over both the bull and bear markets. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. For example, the six largest pyramidical groups (namely, the Anglo American-De Beers, Rembrandt, Sanlam, Old Mutual, Liberty Life 
Insurance and Anglovaal Groups) control over 70% of the value of all shares listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, with the 
Anglo American-De Beers Group controlling 17 of the 20 largest quoted firms (Barr et al., 1995, p. 1; Okeahalam, 2004; Fosu, 2013). 
2. We note that other competing theories, such as equity fairness and the „Lake Wobegon Effect‟ have emerged recently. Lee et al. (2008) 
provide a detailed review of a number of possible alternative theoretical explanations. 
3. Murphy (1999), Core et al. (2003) and Van Essen et al. (2012) provide comprehensive reviews of this literature. 
4. As financials and utilities are subject to different regulations and also differ in capital structure (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim et 
al., 2012a), and following past studies (Blackwell et al., 2007; Dong et al., 2010), we exclude 111 financials and utilities, leaving us with 
291 companies to be sampled. 
5. Current year executive pay, especially bonus decisions, is based on previous year‟s performance. Additionally, executive actions take 
time to reflect in accounting and share price performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Main et al., 1996). Thus, to avoid endogeneity 
problems, as well as following previous studies (Conyon, 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Ozkan, 2011), we introduce a one year lag 
between total executive pay and corporate performance in such a way that this year‟s total executive pay depends on previous year‟s 
corporate performance and CG structures. 
6. Some of the advantages for using panel data include having both time-series and cross-sectional observations, as well as less 
multicollinearity among the variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). 
7. As Panel B in Table 1 indicates, for the remaining 122 companies, one or more years‟ financial data and annual reports were not 
available in Datastream/Perfect Information Database. In addition, for lack of sufficient number of observations in three industries, 
namely health care, oil & gas, and telecommunications industries with three, one and three listed firms, respectively, observations from 
these industries were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. As a result (see Panel B in Table 1), the three health care 
firms were added to the consumer services industry, the one oil & gas firm was included in the basic materials industry, while the three 
telecommunications companies were included in the technology firms. 
8. The option compensation is calculated by using the standard Black-Scholes [1973] option pricing model, Executive compensation 
disclosure rules in SA require all share-based executive options to be disclosed in the annual report at their grant date. However, a 
considerable number of share-based executive options granted in SA are not normally exercised, and are, therefore, allowed to expire. 
Thus, to accurately capture total executive compensation, we include only the value of all vested/exercised options in our valuation of 
share-based executive options. We do not, however, include a CEO‟s change in wealth from stock ownership and dividends in our 
calculation of total executive compensation because the data required is not currently available.  
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9. The theoretical expectation is that by permitting simultaneous interdependencies among the variables, the simultaneous equation 
approach will produce more consistent coefficients (Gujarati, 20003; Wooldridge, 2010) and indeed, the main evidence from the 
mainstream CG literature where it has been applied widely is that it is better specified and more robust in addressing potential 
endogeneity problems (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Crutchley, 1999; Beiner et 
al., 2004, 2006; Ghosh, 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a; amongst others). 
10. As is the case in all previous studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Crutchley, 
1999; Beiner et al., 2004, 2006; Ghosh, 2007; Elsila et al., 2013), and will be explained further, the endogenous-exogenous 
dichotomisation of the variables used in our system of equations is mainly based on prior theoretical and logical predictions, as well as 
practical and data availability reasons (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, b; Van Lent, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). Therefore, and 
depending on what is being determined in an equation within our system, a variable may be classified as endogenous or exogenous based 
on previous theory, logic and practice. For example, and similar to Agrawal and Knoeber and Beiner et al. (2004, 2006), we classify firm 
size, sales growth, capital expenditure, year, and industry as exogenous in all our equations. By contrast, other variables are only 
exogenous in specific equations. For instance, and theoretically, larger firms are more likely to cross-list and be audited by a big four 
audit firm (Beiner et al., 2006), and therefore, cross-listing and audit firm size are exogenous in the BSIZE equation, whilst dividend 
payment may signal the availability of excess cash flows (Jensen, 1986), and therefore, we classify dividend payment status as 
exogenous in the LEV equation. As will be further explained, we also carried out Hausman system specification and Sargan exogeneity 
tests, but both tests rejected system misspecification and variable endogeneity for all seven equations. We are, therefore, confident that 
our system of equations is well specified.  
11. This growth rate is substantially higher than the increase in the average annual SA Consumer Price Index (CPI) and employee earnings 
over the same period. To facilitate comparison, annual CPI values published by the International Monetary Fund for SA are 9.9%, 5.9%, 
4.5%, 4% and 5% in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively, with a five-year average of 5.86%. 
12. To minimise the effects of outliers, and following previous studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Guest, 2009; Wintoki et al., 2012), we 
winsorise all the variables at the conventional 1% and 99% levels before estimating our regressions. However, the whole regression 
analyses were also run with the outliers included, and the results were essentially the same. The main rationale for winsorising is to 
minimise potential serious violations of the regression assumptions. 
13. The order-condition for identifying a system indicates that the number of exogenous variables excluded from any equation must be 
greater than or equal to the number of endogenous variables included minus one (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2004, 
2006). Our system of equations is made up of 13 exogenous and seven endogenous variables and therefore, at least six endogenous 
variables need to be excluded from any single equation to identify the system. However, following previous research (Chung and Pruitt, 
1996; Beiner et al., 2004, 2006; Ghosh, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010), equations (2) to (8) were independently developed on the 
basis of theory, logic, practice, and data availability without excessive regard to meeting the order-condition. As our system cannot be 
jeopardised by over-identification (Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2004, 2006; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010), all our 
seven equations are over-identified. We also conducted Hausman system specification and Sargan exogeneity tests, but both tests 
rejected system misspecification and variable endogeneity for all seven equations. 
14. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for these insightful suggestions. Further, and for brevity, we use only CEOPAY to carry out 
these additional analyses, but our results remain essentially the same when use TPAY instead of CEOPAY. 
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Table 1.  Summary of the sample selection procedure 
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the  No. in each      Percentage 
 JSE available to be sampled as at 31/12/2007  industry              of sample  
Industrials              81   27.8 
Basic materials              67   23.0 
Consumer services             62   21.3  
Consumer goods              36   12.4  
Technology                  31   10.7  
Health care                7     2.4        
Telecommunications               4     1.4  
Oil and gas                3     1.0 
Total firms available to be sampled          291                   100.0 
       Less:  Firms with no year‟s dataset available         28     
                  Firms with some years‟ dataset missing        94      122   41.9  
Total sampled firms with full dataset         169   58.1 
Panel B: Industrial composition of     No. in each      Percentage  
 sampled firms with full dataset    industry         of sample  
Industrials               51   30.2 
Consumer services             35   20.7 
Basic materials               33   19.5  
Consumer goods              24   14.2  
Technology               19   11.2  
Health care                3     1.8        
Telecommunications                3     1.8  
Oil and gas                1     0.6 
Total sampled firms with full dataset         169                            100.0 
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Table 2.  Summary of variables  
Total executive pay and CG (endogenous) variables 
TPAY Natural log of total cash (salary, bonus, pension contribution and others) and non-cash/equity (the 
value of disclosed granted shares, vested/exercised options - which is calculated by using the 
standard Black-Scholes [1973] option pricing model, and any other long term incentive plans) based 
pay of all executive directors scaled by the total number of executive directors in a financial year.   
CEOPAY Natural log of cash (base salary, performance bonus, pension contribution and others) and non-
cash/equity (the value of granted shares, vested/exercised options - which is calculated by using the 
standard Black-Scholes [1973] option pricing model, and any other long term incentive plans) based 
pay of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in a financial year.    
ROA   Percentage of operating profit (wc01250) to total assets (wc02999) in a financial year. 
TSR  Natural log of continuously compounded total shareholder return made up of capital gain and 
dividend yield in a financial year. 
Q  Ratio of total assets (wc02999) minus book value of equity (wc03501+wc03451) plus  
market value (mv) of equity to total assets (wc02999) in a financial year.   
BSIZE  Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company in a financial year. 
NEDs   Percentage of non-executive directors to total number of directors on a board in a financial year. 
LEV  Percentage of total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc02999) in a financial year. 
BLKOWN Percentage of common shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company 
Shareholdings at the end of a financial year. 
INSOWN  Percentage of common shares held by institutional shareholders at the end of a financial year. 
Control (exogenous) variables 
NBM  Number of board meetings in a year. 
DOWN  Percentage of common shares held by directors at the end of a financial year. 
DOWN2  Percentage of common shares held by directors squared. 
RCOM  1, if a firm has a remuneration committee consisting entirely of independent non- 
executive directors, 0 otherwise. 
DUAL  1, if the CEO is also the chairperson of the board of directors of a firm, 0 otherwise. 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets (wc02999) at the end of a financial year. 
BIG4  1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte &  
Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  
CROSLIST 1, if a firm is listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
DIV  1, if a firm did pay out dividends in a financial year, 0 otherwise.  
CAPX  Percentage of total capital expenditure (wc04601) to total assets (wc02999). 
SGR Percentage of current year‟s sales (wc01001) minus previous year‟s sales scaled by previous year‟s 
sales. 
CGI   A composite corporate governance (CG) index containing 50 provisions (covering five broad CG  
  areas, including: board, directors, and ownership issues; accounting and auditing issues; risk  
  management, internal audit and control issues; encouraging voluntary compliance and enforcement 
  issues; and integrated sustainability reporting or non-financial issues ) from the 2002 King Report  
  on CG for South Africa that takes a value of 1 if each of the 50 CG provisions is disclosed in the  
  annual report, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. The detailed definitions of  
  these CG provisions are contained in the Appendix in Ntim et al. (2012a:102). 
CEOAGE Natural log of the age (in years – must spent at least six months or more in a financial year with the 
firm) of a firm‟s CEO at end of a financial year. 
CTENURE Natural log of the number of years (must spent at least six months or more in a financial year with 
the firm) that a CEO has worked for a firm in his or her capacity as a CEO at the end of a financial 
year. 
INDUST Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material + oil & gas; consumer goods; 
consumer services + health care; industrials; technology + telecommunications firms. 
YD  Dummies for each of the five years from 2003 to 2007 inclusive. 
CGCOM 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
Notes: The codes in parentheses refer to Datastream codes for the respective accounting and market variables used in the analysis. 
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics of total pay of all executive directors and CEO for all (845) firm years 
       All  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Panel A: Components of all executive directors‟ total pay 
Total cash pay of all executive directors (R000’s) 
Mean      11,246   8,316    8,981  10,824  12,379  14,752 
Median        6,891   4,835    5,899    6,796    7,493    8,964 
Std. dev.     11,327   8,163    9,521  10,752  12,947  14,312 
Min.           112      112       126       325       369       518 
Max.      74,736 49,638  56,470  57,896  70,915  74,736 
Total non-cash/equity pay of all executive directors (R000’s) 
Mean        1,609      974    1,062    1,307    1,586    1,829 
Median           937      521       549       706       983    1,072 
Std. dev.       1,948   1,263    1,346    1,482    1,725    2,365 
Min.               0          0           0           0           0           0 
Max.      12,308   8,965    9,481    9,837  11,391  12,308 
Total pay of all executive directors (R000’s) 
Mean       12,855   9,290  10,043  12,131  13,965  16,581 
Median         7,828   5.356    6,448    7,502    8,476  10,036 
Std. dev.      13,692   9,426  10,867  12,234  14,672  16,260 
Min.            112      112       126       325       369       518 
Max       87,044 58,603  65,951  67,733  82,306  87,044 
Panel B: Components of all executive directors‟ total pay scaled by the total number of executive directors 
Total cash pay of all executive directors scaled by total number of executives (R000’s) 
Mean        1,594   1,180    1,283   1,437    1,672    2,186 
Median           978      686       840      982    1,196    1,308 
Std. dev.       1,610   1,159    1,356   1,610    1,895    2,265 
Min.             16        16         19        44         51         75 
Max.        9,593   6,038    7,065   8,347   8,958    9,593 
Total non-cash/equity pay of all executive directors scaled by the total number of executive directors (R000’s) 
Mean           235      142       156       189       234       263 
Median           141        75         79         98       135       156 
Std. dev.          285      183       194       220       248       341 
Min.               0          0           0           0           0           0 
Max.        1,806   1,264    1,375    1,426    1,632    1,806 
Total pay of all executive directors scaled by the total number of executive directors (R000’s) 
Mean         1,861   1,418    1,483    1,727    1,985    2,342 
Median         1,098      746       939    1,084    1,210    1,430 
Std. dev.        1,985   1,360    1,625    1,852    2,095    2,386 
Min.              16        16         19         44         51         75 
Max       11,340   7,512    8,574    9,432  10,203  11,340  
Panel C: Components of total CEO pay 
Total cash pay of CEO (R000’s) 
Mean         2,136   1,571    1,786    2,040    2,469    2,653 
Median         1,341      724       873    1,061    1,537    1,892 
Std. dev.        2,918   1,583    1,958    2,317    2,891    3,169 
Min.              62        62        75       109       186       271 
Max.       13,069   9,943  10,842  11,678  12,974  13,069 
Total non-cash/equity pay of CEO (R000’s) 
Mean            715      321       468       610       823       986 
Median            409      139       207       364       479       591 
Std. dev.           847      472       609       661       748       875 
Min.                0          0           0           0           0           0 
Max.         3,741   2,463    2,974    3,145    3,397    3,741 
Total pay of CEO (R000’s) 
Mean          2,851   1,892    2,254    2,650    3,292    3,639 
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Median          1,750      863    1,080    1,425    2,016    2,483 
Std. dev.         3,765   2,055    2,567    2,978    3,639    4,044 
Min.               62        62         75       109       286       276 
Max.        16,810          12,406               13,816  14,823  16,371  16,810 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the various components of total pay of all executive directors and CEO denominated in 2003 South African (SA) 
rands (R), and all values are rounded to the nearest thousand. To facilitate comparison, as well as following previous studies (Main et al., 1996; 
Blackwell et al., 2007; Ozkan 2009; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009; Zheng 2010; Huang et al., 2012; Tian, 2013), all the figures have been 
adjusted for inflation, using the SA Consumer Price Index (CPI) to convert them to 2003 rands as the base year. The average US dollar to SA rand 
exchange rate in 2003 is 8.6248 with a five-year average of 9.5395. Total cash pay consists of a base salary, a performance bonus, a pension 
contribution and others. Total non-cash/equity pay includes the value of granted shares, vested/exercised options and any other long-term incentive 
plans (LTIPs).  
 
 
 
Table 4.  Descriptive statistics of the other endogenous/exogenous variables for all (845) firm years.  
Variable                      Mean                 Median              Std. dev.           Maximum             Minimum 
Panel A: Endogenous variables 
TSR                     0.28         0.25                   0.89                  2.36                 -0.48 
ROA                     0.11         0.12      0.14                  0.38                 -0.19  
Q                 1.56         1.34      0.67                  3.60                  0.72  
BSIZE                 9.75       10.00                   3.67                18.00                  4.00 
NEDs                    0.57         0.58      0.15                  0.84                  0.17 
LEV                 0.18         0.16      0.14                  0.56                  0.05 
BLKOWN             0.62         0.65                   0.18                  0.92                  0.10 
INSOWN                   0.74         0.82      0.23                  0.98                  0.09 
Panel B: Exogenous variables 
NBM          4.70        4.00      2.18   15.00     1.00 
DOWN          0.19        0.89      0.18     0.79     0.01 
RCOM                       0.14                     0.00      0.35      1.00     0.00 
DUAL          0.23        0.00      0.43     1.00     0.00  
LNTA          5.86        6.02      0.48     7.83     4.24 
BIG4          0.73        1.00      0.44     1.00     0.00 
CROSLIST         0.22        0.00      0.41     1.00     0.00 
DIV          0.67        1.00      0.47     1.00     0.00 
SGR          0.12        0.14      0.26               0.89                 -0.44 
CAPX          0.13        0.08      0.15     0.66                  0.07 
CGCOM         0.32        0.00      0.47     1.00     0.00 
CGI                                           0.61                      0.64                   0.19                     0.98                     0.06 
CEOAGE       55.48                   53.00                   6.67                   76.00                    34.00 
CTENURE                                7.64                     6.50                   6.88                   28.00                      0.00 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: total shareholder return (TSR), return on assets (ROA), Tobin‟s Q (Q), board size (BSIZE), percentage of 
non-executive directors (NEDs), leverage (LEV), block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), number of board meetings 
(NBM), director ownership (DOWN), the presence of an independent remuneration committee (RCOM), CEO duality (DUAL), firm size (LNTA), 
audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), dividend payment status (DIV), sales growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CAPX), the presence of a 
corporate governance (CG) committee (CGCOM), corporate governance (CG) index (CGI),CEO age (CEOAGE), and CEO tenure (CTENURE). 
Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 5.  Regression of executive pay on performance (TSR) and control variables. 
Dependent variable 
   ________________________________________________________________ 
                                                    All executive directors‟ pay                     CEO pay 
______________________________        ______________________________            
Independent variable  Cash        Non-cash    Total               Cash       Non-cash    Total  
Constant  2.598***         2.656***  2.965***              2.630***        2.828***           2.927*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
TSR   0.025**         0.054***  0.069**              0.046**        0.073***  0.098*** 
   (.041)         (.000)  (.028)              (.037)        (.000)  (.000) 
NBM                -0.006        -0.008 -0.012             -0.001       -0.009 -0.016 
   (.705)         (.802)  (.698)              (.906)        (.662)  (.653) 
DOWN              -0.023**         -0.031**        -0.045**             -0.058**       -0.067*** -0.089*** 
   (.038)         (.026) (.013)              (.011)        (.010)  (.000) 
DOWN2             -0.008        -0.005           -0.009             -0.012       -0.001 -0.004 
    (.699)         (.763) (.658)              (.743)        (.856)  (.789) 
RCOM   -0.183**         -0.156**           -0.112*             -0.175**       -0.186** -0.204*** 
   (.042)         (.049) (.080)              (.039)        (.032)  (.007) 
DUAL   0.002         0.008  0.010              0.014        0.058*  0.045* 
   (.879)         (.730)  (.679)              (.255)        (.073)  (.094) 
BIG4   0.165**         0.157**  0.183***              0.170**        0.185***
   
0.201*** 
   (.036)         (.040)  (.009)              (.023)        (.001)  (.000) 
CROSLIST                0.137**         0.182*** 0.206***              0.129**        0.195***  0.213*** 
   (.024)         (.001) (.000)              (.016)        (.000)  (.000) 
DIV   -0.113*        -0.180**         -0.195***             -0.134**       -0.198*** -0.210*** 
   (.053)         (.014) (.001)              (.028)        (.000)  (.000) 
LNTA   0.217***         0.246*** 0.337***              0.225***        0.258***  0.349*** 
   (.001)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
SGR   0.095***         0.102*** 0.140***              0.110***        0.156***  0.198*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
CAPX                -0.028**        -0.075*** -0.104***             -0.064**       -0.108*** -0.120*** 
   (.035)         (.008)  (.000)              (.018)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2004  0.080***         0.052**  0.093***              0.132***        0.134***  0.139*** 
   (.000)         (.037) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2005  0.101***         0.130*** 0.114***              0.088***        0.092***  0.124*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2006  0.158***         0.160*** 0.164***              0.179***        0.185***  0.203*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2007  0.231***         0.220*** 0.243***              0.280***        0.295***  0.309*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000) (.000) 
INDUST   Included         Included       Included             Included         Included        Included 
F-value   7.403***         8.849*** 8.526***              9.328***        9.764***  9.610*** 
Adjusted R2  0.385         0.406 0.397              0.410        0.428  0.419 
Number of observations 845         845  845              845        845   845 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust firm-clustered standard errors 
technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: total shareholder return 
(TSR), number of board meetings (NBM), director ownership (DOWN), director ownership squared (DOWN2), the presence of an independent 
remuneration committee (RCOM), CEO duality (DUAL), firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), dividend payment 
status (DIV), sales growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CAPX), year (YD) and industry (INDUST). YD 2003 is captured by the constant term in the 
regressions. The industry dummies included were statistically insignificant and are not reported. Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 6. Regression results from a three-stage estimation of equations (2) to (8) for total director pay.  
Dependent variable 
  ________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. variable  TSR         BSIZE              NEDs             LEV              BLKOWN          INSOWN           TPAY 
(Equation)                (2)                     (3)                    (4)                (5)                     (6)                   (7)                     (8)  
Constant 0.572             -1.938 8.906***       -0.867            10.103***        -0.875  0.891 
  (.584)         (.123) (.000)        (.401)            (.000)           (.460)  (.486) 
TSR     -         0.197*** 0.001       -2.573***         0.010          2.032***  0.163*** 
     -         (.000) (.605)        (.000)            (.794)          (.000)  (.000) 
BSIZE  0.128**            -  0.598**        0.128*            0.230          0.479**  0.121*** 
  (.015)            -  (.021)        (.071)            (.385)          (.043)  (.006) 
NEDs  0.053*         0.131***      -        0.073*            0.020          0.042  0.001 
  (.090)         (.000)      -        (.080)             (.416)          (.309)  (.726) 
LEV  -0.036*         0.105** 0.052*            -                0.075**          0.001 -0.018** 
  (.091)         (.019) (.100)                -                (.048)          (.983)  (.043) 
BLKOWN -0.053*        -0.004 -0.041        0.059*                 -          0.499***  0.003 
  (.087)         (.290) (.320)        (.087)                  -          (.000)  (.820) 
INSOWN 0.124**         0.109** 0.008       -0.001  0.379***                - -0.693*** 
  (.011)         (.028) (.763)        (.840)  (.000)                   -  (.000) 
TPAY  2.905***         3.540***       -0.531       -0.360  0.594          -3.753***      - 
  (.000)         (.000) (.462)        (.837)  (.486)           (.000)      - 
BIG4  0.146***         0.007 3.950***       -2.815***      -           3.783***  0.105* 
  (.000)         (.326) (.000)        (.000)      -           (.000)  (.063) 
CAPX  -0.130**          0.003          -0.019*        0.124*** -0.002           -0.016  0.175*** 
  (.043)         (.691) (.092)        (.000)  (.857)           (.794)  (.000) 
CGCOM     -        -0.193           -0.856             -                -2.320**           0.206      - 
      -         (.657) (.591)             -   (.021)           (.790)      - 
CROSLIST 0.298***         0.718*** 3.295***             -       -           4.164***  0.028 
  (.000)         (.000) (.000)             -       -           (.000)  (.321) 
DIV  0.110**              -     -          0.042      -     - -0.124** 
  (.048)                  -     -          (.915)      -     -  (.049) 
DOWN       -         -0.002          -0.128             -     0.202***    - -0.113*** 
       -          (.782)  (.000)                -     (.000)     -  (.000) 
DUAL       -         -0.238  2.697***             -     0.187            0.636  0.031 
       -          (.871)          (.000)              -    (.896)            (.648)  (.967) 
LNTA  -0.143***          2.573***  4.971***           2.420***   -5.459***         5.300***  0.339*** 
  (.008)          (.000)  (.000)          (.000)    (.000)            (.000)  (.000) 
NBM      -          0.112**      -  -       -   - -0.003 
      -          (.020)      -  -       -   -  (.609) 
RCOM      -         -0.047  -0.051  -     0.032            0.130*  -0.128* 
      -          (.418)   (.387)  -     (.410)           (.094)  (.063) 
SGR  0.116**          0.006   0.004           -0.006     0.007            0.002  0.165*** 
  (.042)          (.697)   (.480)           (.317)     (.333)           (.789)  (.000) 
INDUST  Included          Included   Included         Included     Included       Included Included 
YD  Included          Included   Included         Included     Included       Included Included 
F-value  9.458***         10.812***   7.657***          6.528***     5.384***         6.183***    11.896*** 
Adjusted R2 0.415           0.479   0.356           0.323     0.267            0.290 0.483 
N  845            845   845           845     845             845 845 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust firm-clustered standard errors 
technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: total shareholder return 
(TSR), board size (BSIZE), percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs), leverage (LEV), block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership 
(INSOWN), total pay of all executive directors (TPAY), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPX), the presence of a corporate governance 
committee (CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), dividend payment status (DIV), director ownership (DOWN), CEO duality (DUAL), firm size 
(LNTA), number of board meetings (NBM), the presence of a independent remuneration committee (RCOM), sales growth (SGR), industry 
(INDUST) and year (YD). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 7.  Regression results from a three-stage estimation of equations (2) to (8) for total CEO pay.  
Dependent variable 
  ________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. variable  TSR         BSIZE              NEDs             LEV              BLKOWN          INSOWN         CEOPAY 
(Equation)                (2)                     (3)                    (4)                (5)                     (6)                   (7)                     (8)  
Constant 0.681            -2.875* 9.894***       -1.546           13.264***         -1.998  0.620 
  (.465)         (.063) (.000)        (.193)            (.000)           (.181)  (.494) 
TSR     -         0.261*** 0.004       -3.829***         0.006          2.108***  0.197*** 
     -         (.000) (.526)        (.010)            (.901)          (.000)  (.000) 
BSIZE  0.168***            -  0.760***        0.154*            0.078          0.607**  0.134*** 
  (.000)            -  (.000)        (.060)            (.291)          (.035)  (.000) 
NEDs  0.092**         0.124***      -        0.086*            0.038          0.054  0.009 
  (.046)         (.000)      -        (.057)             (.393)          (.288)  (.685) 
LEV  -0.047*         0.110** 0.069*            -                0.084**          0.008 -0.023** 
  (.082)         (.011) (.083)                -                (.035)          (.873)  (.031) 
BLKOWN -0.076*        -0.008 -0.032        0.063*                 -          0.510***  0.010 
  (.054)         (.263) (.367)        (.074)                  -          (.000)  (.753) 
INSOWN 0.243**         0.102** 0.004       -0.008  0.406***                - -0.894*** 
  (.027)         (.035) (.890)        (.784)  (.000)                   -  (.000) 
CEOPAY 3.682***         3.964***        -0.462       -0.217  0.516          -4.379***      - 
  (.000)         (.000) (.349)        (.579)  (.323)           (.000)      - 
BIG4  0.258***         0.030 5.318***       -3.336***      -           4.975***  0.126** 
  (.000)         (.641) (.000)        (.000)      -           (.000)  (.021) 
CAPX  -0.145**          0.001          -0.023*        0.136*** -0.015           -0.031  0.280*** 
  (.037)         (.779) (.071)        (.000)  (.680)           (.579)  (.000) 
CGCOM     -        -0.215           -1.095             -                -2.683**           0.387      - 
      -         (.407) (.154)             -   (.017)           (.879)      - 
CROSLIST 0.386***         0.996*** 3.730***             -       -           4.561***  0.032 
  (.000)         (.000) (.000)             -       -           (.000)  (.691) 
DIV  0.129**              -     -          0.053      -     - -0.138** 
  (.037)                  -     -          (.896)      -     -  (.027) 
DOWN       -          -0.010          -0.143             -     0.218***    - -0.126*** 
       -           (.650)  (.000)                -     (.000)     -  (.000) 
DUAL       -          -0.219  3.286***             -     0.127            0.520  0.045 
       -           (.393)          (.000)              -    (.943)            (.781)  (.839) 
LNTA  -0.167***           2.702***  5.633***           2.805***   -6.852***         6.984***  0.345*** 
  (.000)           (.000)  (.000)          (.000)    (.000)            (.000)  (.000) 
NBM      -           0.102**      -  -       -   - -0.009 
      -           (.033)      -  -       -   -  (.572) 
RCOM      -          -0.061  -0.076  -     0.065            0.181*  -0.147** 
      -           (.383)   (.360)  -     (.374)           (.069)  (.032) 
SGR  0.270***           0.001   0.014           -0.008     0.019            0.007  0.193*** 
  (.000)           (.896)   (.273)           (.291)     (.286)           (.752)  (.000) 
INDUST  Included           Included   Included         Included     Included       Included    Included 
YD  Included           Included   Included         Included     Included       Included    Included 
F-value  9.718***        11.216***   7.930***          6.859***     6.084***        6.538***     12.053*** 
Adjusted R2 0.424           0.482   0.371           0.340     0.289            0.317 0.496 
N  845            845   845           845     845             845 845 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust firm-clustered standard errors 
technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: total shareholder return 
(TSR), board size (BSIZE), percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs), leverage (LEV), block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership 
(INSOWN), total CEO pay (CEOPAY), audit firm size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPX), the presence of a corporate governance committee 
(CGCOM), cross-listing (CROSLIST), dividend payment status (DIV), director ownership (DOWN), CEO duality (DUAL), firm size (LNTA), 
number of board meetings (NBM), the presence of a independent remuneration committee (RCOM), sales growth (SGR), industry (INDUST) and 
year (YD). Table 2 fully defines all the variables used.  
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Table 8.  Regression of executive pay on alternative performance (ROA) proxy and control variables. 
Dependent variable 
   ________________________________________________________________ 
                                                    All executive directors‟ pay                     CEO pay 
______________________________        ______________________________            
Independent variable  Cash        Non-cash    Total               Cash       Non-cash    Total  
Constant  3.286***          3.485***  3.741***              3.160***        3.693***          4.395*** 
   (.000)         (.000)  (.000)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
ROA   0.030**         0.065***  0.071**              0.051**        0.084***  0.103*** 
   (.021)         (.000)  (.034)              (.023)        (.000)  (.000) 
NBM                -0.001        -0.005 -0.019             -0.007       -0.024 -0.027 
   (.736)         (.827)  (.671)              (.890)        (.536)  (.615) 
DOWN              -0.018*          -0.040**         -0.053**             -0.097***       -0.026* -0.038** 
   (.069)         (.020) (.026)              (.000)        (.059)  (.031) 
DOWN2   -0.001        -0.010           -0.003             -0.009       -0.004 -0.007 
    (.710)         (.572) (.703)              (.760)        (.815)  (.769) 
RCOM   -0.169**         -0.160**           -0.107*             -0.161**       -0.193** -0.219*** 
   (.038)         (.047) (.094)              (.046)        (.028)  (.000) 
DUAL   0.001         0.002  0.016              0.009        0.072**  0.083** 
   (.907)         (.756)  (.653)              (.360)        (.046)  (.035) 
LNTA   0.253***         0.306*** 0.347***              0.241***        0.324***  0.351*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
BIG4   0.141**         0.182**  0.190***              0.154**        0.168**
   
0.216*** 
   (.048)         (.029)  (.000)              (.037)        (.015)  (.000) 
CROSLIST                0.106*         0.120** 0.156**              0.093*        0.205***  0.224*** 
   (.081)         (.027) (.019)              (.055)        (.000)  (.000) 
DIV   -0.081        -0.109*          -0.146**             -0.112**       -0.150** -0.192*** 
   (.106)         (.057) (.023)              (.044)        (.012)  (.007) 
SGR   0.106***         0.117*** 0.163***              0.147***        0.180***  0.205*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
CAPX                -0.019*        -0.098*** -0.116***             -0.051**        -0.119*** -0.138*** 
   (.063)         (.000)  (.000)              (.027)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2004   0.093***          0.067**   0.108***              0.146***        0.150***  0.178*** 
   (.000)         (.019) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2005  0.114***         0.153*** 0.139***              0.104***        0.125***  0.137*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2006  0.173***         0.186*** 0.190***              0.187***        0.192***  0.211*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2007  0.249***         0.250*** 0.267***              0.290***        0.315***  0.326*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000) (.000) 
INDUST   Included         Included Included              Included        Included        Included 
F-value   7.153***         8.396*** 7.865***              8.291***        8.679***  8.875*** 
Adjusted R2  0.376         0.391 0.387              0.389        0.401  0.414 
Number of observations 845         845  845              845        845   845 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust firm-clustered standard errors 
technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), 
number of board meetings (NBM), director ownership (DOWN), director ownership squared (DOWN2), the presence of an independent remuneration 
committee (RCOM), CEO duality (DUAL), firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), dividend payment status (DIV), 
sales growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CAPX), year (YD) and industry (INDUST). YD 2003 is captured by the constant term in the regressions. 
The industry dummies included were statistically insignificant and are not reported. Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 9.  Regression of executive pay on alternative performance (Q) proxy and control variables. 
Dependent variable 
   ________________________________________________________________ 
                                                    All executive directors‟ pay                     CEO pay 
______________________________        ______________________________            
Independent variable  Cash        Non-cash    Total               Cash       Non-cash    Total  
Constant  2.431**           2.493**  2.518***             2.672***        2.769***          2.985*** 
   (.025)         (.018)  (.010)              (.000)        (.000)             (.000) 
Q   0.028**         0.051**  0.067**              0.039**        0.060**  0.075*** 
   (.024)         (.036)  (.014)              (.045)        (.018)  (.000) 
NBM                -0.010        -0.016 -0.027             -0.008       -0.012 -0.028 
   (.671)         (.750)  (.519)              (.873)        (.654)  (.579) 
DOWN                -0.034**         -0.040**        -0.038**             -0.063***       -0.075*** -0.097*** 
   (.028)         (.017) (.019)              (.010)        (.000)  (.000) 
DOWN2                              -0.011        -0.008           -0.013             -0.018       -0.006 -0.009 
    (.580)         (.705) (.629)              (.727)        (.832)  (.684) 
RCOM   -0.172**         -0.129*              -0.101*             -0.188**       -0.196** -0.217*** 
   (.026)         (.057) (.098)              (.027)        (.024)  (.000) 
DUAL   0.001         0.003  0.027              0.001        0.019  0.021 
   (.884)         (.746)  (.494)              (.406)        (.117)  (.115) 
LNTA   0.256***         0.291*** 0.347***              0.274***        0.343***  0.358*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
BIG4   0.171**         0.163**  0.194***              0.183**        0.196***
   
0.237*** 
   (.029)         (.036)  (.000)              (.019)        (.000)  (.000) 
CROSLIST                0.159***         0.195*** 0.217***              0.160***        0.201***  0.220*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
DIV   -0.126**        -0.197** 0.218***             -0.150**       -0.224*** -0.241*** 
   (.041)         (.011) (.000)              (.019)        (.000)  (.000) 
SGR   0.112***         0.123*** 0.162***              0.145***        0.183***  0.218*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
CAPX                -0.046**        -0.089*** -0.116***             -0.082***        0.124*** -0.130*** 
   (.027)         (.000)  (.000)              (.010)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2004  0.076***         0.048*  0.087***              0.126***        0.128***  0.134*** 
   (.000)         (.054) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2005  0.098***         0.127*** 0.105***              0.091***        0.096***  0.129*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2006  0.147***         0.153*** 0.159***              0.181***        0.187***  0.198*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000)  (.000) 
YD 2007  0.224***         0.218*** 0.231***              0.265***        0.273***  0.290*** 
   (.000)         (.000) (.000)              (.000)        (.000) (.000) 
INDUST   Included        Included       Included              Included         Included        Included 
F-value   6.987***         7.910*** 7.643***              7.894***        8.327***  8.875*** 
Adjusted R2  0.368         0.385 0.369              0.378        0.390  0.409 
Number of observations 845         845  845              845        845   845 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust firm-clustered standard errors 
technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin‟s Q (Q), number 
of board meetings (NBM), director ownership (DOWN), director ownership squared (DOWN2), the presence of an independent remuneration 
committee (RCOM), CEO duality (DUAL), firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), dividend payment status (DIV), 
sales growth (SGR), capital expenditure (CAPX), year (YD) and industry (INDUST). YD 2003 is captured by the constant term in the regressions. 
The industry dummies included were statistically insignificant and are not reported. Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 10. Additional analyses: GMM estimation, interaction and changes effects, and governance index 
Dependent variable 
          ____________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                    CEO pay    
                                     ____________________________________________________________________________             
 Model                           (1)                 (2)                 (3)                   (4)                   (5)                    (6)                   (7) 
Independent variable ∆CEOPAY    GMM         I-EFFECT       CEOPAY      ∆CEOPAY      I-EFFECT        CEOPAY 
Constant        0.134            0.275        2.860***           2.640***           0.140                2.934***               2.672** 
        (.308)           (.190)       (.000)  (.000)           (.296)               (.000)              (.000) 
∆TSRt        0.020**            -                       -                    -                   0.025**            -                     - 
        (.046)             -                        -                    -                  (.040)            -                    - 
TSRt                               -               0.086***           0.125***               0.104***                           -                      0.134***                  0.106*** 
                                      -               (.000)             (.000)              (.000)                  -                   (.000)             (.000) 
CEOPAYt-1          -               0.429***           -                   -              -                        -                     - 
           -               (000)                   -                   -              -                        -                     - 
TSR*BSIZE          -                   -                  0.296***              -              -                   0.310***    - 
           -                  -                  (.000)                 -              -                   (.000)                 - 
TSR*NEDs                    -                  -                 -0.165***              -              -                  -0.170***              - 
            -                  -                  (.007)          -              -           (.000)                  - 
TSR*LEV          -                  -                 -0.020                      -                -                  -0.023                  - 
                         -                 -                  (.496)              -              -                  (.475)                  - 
TSR*BLKOWN          -                  -                  -0.013                 -              -                 -0.018                  - 
                         -                 -                  (.785)          -               -                  (.754)                  - 
TSR*INSOWN          -                 -                 -0.309***               -              -                 -0.326***    - 
           -                 -                  (.000)                 -              -                  (.000)                  - 
CGI           -                 -                     -                   0.136***                 -     0.096***    - 
           -                 -                     -             (.000)              -                  (.000)                  - 
CEOAGE          -                 -                     -                -              -                     -                  0.159*** 
           -                 -                     -                -              -                     -            (.000) 
CTENURE                    -                       -                        -                      -                          -                    -                  0.116** 
                                      -                -                     -                      -                          -                     -                 (.025) 
∆CGI                             -                -                     -                      -                      0.088***             -                      - 
                                      -               -                      -                      -                      (.000)                 -                     - 
TSR*CGI                       -               -                     -                      -                            -                0.175***              -              
                                      -               -                      -                     -                            -                (.000)                 - 
OTHER CG VAR.         -             -                     Yes                   -                            -                  Yes                   - 
OTHER CONTROLS  Yes          Yes                Yes                  Yes                     Yes                Yes                 Yes  
YD         Yes          Yes                Yes                  Yes                     Yes                Yes                 Yes  
INDUST                      Yes          Yes                Yes                  Yes                     Yes                Yes                 Yes 
Sargan P-value             -          (.265)                 -                       -                          -                     -                       -              
Hansen P-value            -          (.438)                 -                       -                          -                     -                       -                
Hansen (Diff) P-value -          (.576)                  -                      -                           -                     -                       - 
AR(1) test P-value     -            (.008)***               -                         -                              -                       -                           - 
AR(2) test P-value     -            (.195)                 -                       -                           -                    -                        - 
F-value                    4.932***         -                9.754***         9.475***         7.340***   9.839***             9.586*** 
Adjusted R2             0.214           -                0.492         0.418         0.305   0.508              0.424 
N                      676         676                 845                  845            676              845   845 
Notes: Models 1 and 5 test for changes (∆CEOPAY) effects, whilst Models 3 and 6 test for interaction (I-EFFECT) effects. Model 2 contains 
coefficients obtained by estimating a difference-generalised method of moments (GMM) equation. Model 4 tests for the effect of the presence of an 
alternative CG measure, whilst model 7 tests for the presence of additional control variables. AR (1) and AR(2) are tests for first- and second-order 
serial correlation in the first differenced regression residuals under the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. Sargan test of over-
identification restrictions and Hansen test of over-identification restrictions are under the null hypotheses that all instruments are valid. Difference-
in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null hypothesis that instruments used are exogenous. P-values are in parentheses. Following Petersen 
(2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust firm-clustered standard errors technique. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. Table 2 fully defines all the variables used. 
